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Abstract—ARINC 429 is the most common data bus in use
today in civil avionics. However, the protocol lacks any form
of source authentication. A technician with physical access
to the bus is able to replace a transmitter by a rogue device,
and the receivers will accept its malicious data as they have
no method of verifying the authenticity of messages.
Updating the protocol would close off security loopholes
in new aircraft but would require thousands of airplanes to
be modified. For the interim, until the protocol is replaced,
we propose the first intrusion detection system that utilizes
a hardware fingerprinting approach for sender identification
for the ARINC 429 data bus. Our approach relies on the
observation that changes in hardware, such as replacing a
transmitter or a receiver with a rogue one, modify the electric
signal of the transmission.
Because we rely on the analog properties, and not on the
digital content of the transmissions, we are able to detect a
hardware switch as soon as it occurs, even if the data that is
being transmitted is completely normal. Thus, we are able
to preempt the attack before any damage is caused.
In this paper we describe the design of our intrusion de-
tection system and evaluate its performance against different
adversary models. Our analysis includes both a theoretical
Markov-chain model and an extensive empirical evaluation.
For this purpose, we collected a data corpus of ARINC 429
data traces, which may be of independent interest since, to
the best of our knowledge, no public corpus is available. We
find that our intrusion detection system is quite realistic:
e.g., it achieves near-zero false alarms per second, while
detecting a rogue transmitter in under 50ms, and detecting a
rogue receiver in under 3 seconds. In other words, technician
attacks can be reliably detected during the pre-flight checks,
well before the aircraft takes off.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
ARINC 429 [1] is a prominent standard for wired
intra-vehicle communication in civil aviation. Most active
and retired airplanes contain ARINC buses [16], intercon-
necting the many digital systems that are necessary for the
operation of an aircraft: sensors, radars, engines, cockpit
controls and more.
Safety and reliability are key objectives in avionics
[16]. Therefore, the main requirements of airborne subsys-
tems are high determinism and low response times [38].
ARINC 429 was designed accordingly. Security on the
other hand, as we understand it today, was not a primary
concern. At the time of the protocol’s release in 1977,
awareness of the threat of cyber-physical attacks was not
as widespread as it is today. ARINC 429 was designed
without any security features, such as encryption or source
authentication, that are perceived today as essential to
secure communication. In the years that have passed the
importance of proper cybersecurity was demonstrated in
numerous fields, from industrial networks [22] to cars
[25] to avionics [10]. A recent study [36] has found
that attacks on wireless safety-related avionics systems
have the potential of disrupting ongoing flights, inducing
financial loss to airlines and reducing safety. In contrast
to advancements in cybersecurity, there were no major
revisions of the ARINC 429 standard since 1980 [37].
AFDX is the successor to ARINC 429. It is Ethernet
based, so IPSec or other modern solutions can be applied.
Still, to quote from [16]: “[...] 429 will most likely not
simply vanish; it will still be used in scenarios where sim-
ple signaling is sufficient, and in latency critical scenarios.
It is a proven and extremely reliable technology and thus
is also used as fallback network for the AFDX network,
e.g. in the Airbus A380.”
In particular, ARINC 429 has no mechanism for
source authentication, so once an adversary has gained
physical access to bus, any data they transmit will be
accepted.
One way to add authentication without an industry-
wide update of the protocol is to implement it at a higher
layer of the protocol stack. Unfortunately, in ARINC 429
there are only 19 data bits in a message. This is typically
insufficient for a secure implementation of message code
authentication (MAC).
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are often employed
to retrofit security into similar systems that were designed
without security in mind, such as CAN bus in automobile
systems [28]. An IDS is a software or device that con-
tinuously compares the observed behavior of the system
to the expected behavior and raises an alarm whenever
anomalies are detected. However, intrusion detection sys-
tems that analyze only the message content are limited
in their ability to identify the sender of a message. An
attacker that is aware of the presence of the IDS might
attempt to fool it by sending data that is identical or very
similar to normal data. Therefore, in order to identify the
message source, we need to analyze the electrical signal.
The guiding principle is that every transmitter is unique,
even those of the same model and maker, due to minor
defects in production, component tolerances etc., which
manifest in the electrical signal. Hence, every signal has
inimitable characteristics that can be used to identify the
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sender. To a lesser extent, the signal is also affected by
the receivers and the bus topology. The characteristics can
be used to identify changes to passive components on the
bus. The process of learning to associate a signal to a
transmitter is called hardware fingerprinting.
It is important to note that hardware fingerprinting
cannot replace the use of content-based IDSs, as hardware
fingerprinting only detects attacks, where one transmitter
sends messages, that are normally sent by another trans-
mitter. On the other hand, an IDS that inspects only the
data is at risk of being fooled by a clever adversary that
mimics normal behavior. Using both methods in tandem
supplies protection against the widest range of attacks.
Exploring content-based detection is beyond the scope of
this paper.
1.2. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first academic
research to suggest hardware fingerprinting in ARINC
429. However, hardware fingerprinting was explored pre-
viously in a number of different domains: Ethernet [17],
[21], [39]; wireless radio [5], [14], [41]; smartphone ac-
celerometers, gyroscopes, microphones and cameras [11],
[12].
One domain in particular is of special interest to
us: controller area network (CAN bus) [33], the most
commonly used standard for in-vehicle communication
in the automotive industry. ARINC 429 and CAN bus
have a lot in common: Both are protocols for wired local
area networks. Both are meant to be used in a static
topology. Both share similar bit rates (up to 100 Kbits/sec
in ARINC, up to 1 Mbits/sec in CAN) and similar word
lengths (32 bits in ARINC, up to 128 bits in CAN). Both
were formulated more than 30 years ago, and both were
not designed for security but rather for safety, and as a
consequence lack source authentication.
In recent years a number of successful cyber-attacks
were demonstrated on cars [25], motivating researchers to
search for new ways to hinder attacks.
In [6] the authors propose using the measured arrival
time of periodic messages to estimate characteristics of
a transmitter’s internal clock, which are then used as
fingerprints. It has been demonstrated in [34] that timing
features can be emulated by an adversary, and therefore
might not be a reliable means for identification.
In [27] the authors demonstrate that transmitters of
CAN messages can be identified by the signal’s electrical
characteristics. They propose using the CAN message ID
field of the electric signal as a fingerprint. They also
observed that the electrical characteristics remain stable
for a period of months in a lab setup.
In [8] the authors suggest using time domain and fre-
quency domain features extracted from the CAN ID field
as fingerprints. They perform feature selection using the
mutual information criterion in order to reduce the number
of used features. Machine learning (ML) techniques are
utilized for classification (SVM, NN and BDT).
In [7] the authors devise a method for generating
fingerprints based on the order statistics of voltage levels.
The algorithm adapts to fluctuations in power supply lev-
els and to changes in temperature by constantly updating
the fingerprints based on new samples.
In [9] the authors construct the fingerprints by ex-
tracting time domain and frequency domain features from
selected parts of a message. They perform feature selec-
tion with sequential forward selection, and SVM and BDT
for classification. Incremental learning techniques [13] are
employed in order to compensate for temporal changes of
the characteristics.
In [20], when identifying the source of a frame, the au-
thors first construct a number of artificial signals from that
frame. The artificial signals are made by cutting the signal
and concatenating parts that share a similar behavior:
positive slope transient, negative slope transient and stable
positive voltage. For each of these three artificial signals,
a set of time domain and frequency domain features are
extracted.
CAN bus and ARINC 429 use different line protocols,
therefore methods presented in the above papers cannot
be directly applied to our problem without change. A key
difference between the two protocols is the bus topology.
In CAN bus dozens of transceivers may share one bus.
The main threat CAN papers are dealing with is device
hijacking, where one ECU is remotely hacked, and starts
to transmit the messages of another ECU on the same bus.
Since during normal operation of a car, devices do not
spontaneously join or leave the network, all the devices
are known to the defender in advance. This scenario
naturally fits into a multiclass classification setting, where
a message needs to be identified as belonging to one of
many known classes. In ARINC 429 on the other hand,
only one transmitter is allowed on a line. Only that single
transmitter is known to the defender beforehand. The task
is to categorize a message as either normal or as an
anomaly (an attack). Multiclass classification algorithms
are not suitable for this task, because only samples from
the normal class can be obtained for training. Instead we
need to use anomaly detection algorithms [32]. Of the
CAN bus papers we reviewed, only [8] and [9] extend their
algorithms to handle detection of unknown transmitters.
1.3. Contributions
We propose the use of hardware fingerprinting in order
to imbue ARINC 429 buses with source authentication
capabilities. Applying the method only requires the at-
tachment of a standard-compliant monitoring unit to the
bus. This method does not require hardware or software
updates to existing systems and is compliant with the
current version of the ARINC standard.
We describe the adversary models that our method is
effective at protecting against. We then design an intrusion
detection system with hardware fingerprinting capabilities,
and evaluate its performance in these attack scenarios.
We explore the ability to distinguish between devices
from different vendors and between devices of the same
model, based on the hardware fingerprints of individual
transmitted words. We find that it is possible to distinguish
between transmitters and receivers by their electric signal,
with low error rates. This observation applies both to
devices from different vendors and to devices from the
same vendor and model, which are supposedly identical.
We explore the effect of receivers and transmission
lines on performance. We see that adding a receiver does
not yield a significant change in the signal. However,
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switching a receiver by another receiver, when combined
with a change to the transmission line, is detectable by
our method.
We compare different feature sets under different the
adversarial models. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that
using the raw samples, without extracting any features,
yields the best outcome when detecting a transmitter
switch. In case of a receiver switch, we find that features
derived from a polynomial fit outperform the other feature
set.
In order to drive the false-alarms-per-second rate to
zero, we suggest to augment the per-word anomaly de-
tection by a “suspicion counter” that increases with each
word flagged as an anomaly, and decreases with every
normal word. We first analyze the suspicion counter using
a Markov-chain model, and then evaluate the full system’s
performance using the empirical data. We demonstrate
that our intrusion detection system is quite realistic: e.g.,
it achieves near-zero false alarms per second, while de-
tecting a rogue transmitter in under 50ms, and detecting
a rogue receiver in under 3 seconds. In other words,
technician attacks can be reliably detected during the pre-
flight checks, well before the aircraft takes off.
Organization: Section 2 describes the ARINC 429
protocol and the adversary model. Section 3 presents the
data set we collected, and Section 4 demonstrates a proof
of concept. Section 5 outlines our hardware fingerprinting
approach. Section 6 describes our signal segmentation
process and Section 7 covers the various feature sets we
considered. Section 8 describes the empirical evaluation
of our detection method when it is based on single words.
Section 9 presents a Markov-chain analysis of the suspi-
cion counter, and Section 10 describes the empirical per-
formance evaluation of the complete method. We conclude
with Section 11.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. The ARINC 429 Standard
ARINC Specification 429 [1], also named “Mark 33
Digital Transfer System (DITS)”, is a standard of the
avionics industry. It defines a protocol for the communi-
cation between avionics system elements over a local area
network. First published in 1977 by Aeronautical Radio,
Inc., it has since become one of the most widely used data
bus protocols in civil aircrafts [26]. The protocol encom-
passes different layers: from the physical requirements,
through the electronic characteristics of the signal, data
format and ending with a file transfer technique.
We continue with a short description of those parts
of the specifications, which are relevant to this paper. In
ARINC 429 the communicating entities are called line-
replaceable units (LRU). Data is transmitted over a single
twisted and shielded pair of wires. The cable shield is
grounded on both ends. The lines are denoted Line A
and Line B. Differential signaling is used, meaning that
the signal is the voltage difference from Line A to Line
B, rather than the difference from one wire to ground.
Bipolar return-to-zero (BRTZ) modulation is used as a line
protocol. BRTZ is a tri-level state modulation: we refer to
the three voltage levels as “HI”, “LO” and “NULL”. A
Figure 1. ARINC 429 bus showing the voltage difference between
twisted pair for bits 0101. Counter-clockwise starting from the top left:
Line A, Line B, the differential signal
binary 1 is encoded as a positive voltage pulse “HI”, and
a binary 0 is encoded as a negative voltage pulse “LO”. In
between transmissions, the voltage drops to 0V, “NULL”.
Every “HI” and every “LO” are preceded and are followed
by a “NULL”, even if repeating bit values are transmitted
consecutively. The differential output voltage from line A
to line B is 10V ± 1 in “HI” mode, 0 ± 0.5 in “NULL”
mode and −10V ± 1 in “LO” mode. Figure 1 shows a
recording of a transmission on an ARINC 429 data bus.
Data is transmitted in words that are 32-bit long. The
bits are transmitted in the following order, from first to
last: 8, 7, ..., 2, 1, 9, 10, ..., 32. This order is a legacy
from older systems. In this paper, words are interpreted
as though an MSB-first transmission order is in place.
Data on the ARINC 429 bus is transmitted unidirec-
tionally from a single transmitter LRU to up to 20 receiver
LRUs. Only one transmitter LRU is allowed on the bus -
a separate bus is required for each transmitter. Since there
is only one transmitter on each bus, there is no sender ID
field in ARINC messages.
The protocol allows a choice of one of two bit rates:
Slow, at 12.0 to 14.5 Kbits/sec, and fast, at 100 Kbits/sec.
The bit rate on a bus is fixed and maintained within %1.
The signal is self-clocking.
MIL-STD-1553 [40] is the military bus standard alter-
native of ARINC 429.
2.2. The Adversary Model
Our method is designed to guard against “technician
attacks”. This type of attack involves an adversary that has
brief physical access to the system. Such an adversary is
able to replace LRUs or add new ones to the bus.
The adversary may have prior knowledge of the hard-
ware and topology of the attacked system. The reverse is
not true: As defenders, we have no prior knowledge of
what the adversary’s hardware might be. However, we do
assume that the adversary will use commercial off-the-
shelf hardware.
We only consider attacks, where the adversary changes
the hardware that is connected to the bus, as other types
of attack do not affect the signal characteristics.
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We distinguish between several types of attacks.
2.2.1. A Rogue Transmitter. In this type of attack an
adversary replaces a legitimate transmitter LRU by a rogue
one. During an initial dormant phase of the attack, the new
device imitates the behavior of the original transmitter,
transmitting data exactly as requested, in order to remain
hidden. Only at a later time, the attack moves on to its
active phase. During this phase the rogue transmitter LRU
sends out messages which are meant to disrupt the work
of the system, and in extreme cases causes irreversible
damage to the electronic or physical components.
2.2.2. A Rogue Receiver. In this attack type of attack the
adversary replaces a legitimate receiver LRU by a rogue
one, or adds a rogue receiver LRU without detaching an-
other LRU. By doing this the adversary gains access to the
transmitted data, which might be otherwise inaccessible,
and may use this data to cause harm through another attack
channel.
2.2.3. Adding a Transmitter or Converting a Receiver
to a Transmitter. An attack wherein the adversary adds
another transmitter LRU to the bus, without detaching the
legitimate transmitter, is actually not possible to perform
on the ARINC bus. The ARINC 429 bus is designed
to allow exactly one transmitter LRU. Connecting two
transmitters to the same bus irreparably violates the elec-
trical properties of the system. Therefore, an adversary
cannot simply add a transmitter (built from off-the-shelf
components) to the bus. The adversary needs to make
sure that the legitimate transmitter is disconnected before
connecting the rogue transmitter. Otherwise, there is a
risk that data will fail to be delivered. In fact, when
we naively connected two transmitters to the same bus,
the peak to peak voltage dropped by half, and the legit-
imate communication on the bus failed. While we don’t
assert that this will always be the case, it serves as a
cautionary anecdote for adversaries. Further, an adversary
may possibly construct special hardware that would allow
the bus to function with two or more transmitters, for
example by disconnecting the legitimate transmitter during
transmissions of the rogue transmitter, but the fact remains
that standard commercial components would not suffice.
Furthermore, it is not possible to turn a receiver LRU
into a transmitter LRU by hijacking its software, since the
LRU’s wiring does not permit it.
3. The Data Set
To the best of our knowledge, there is no publicly
available data set that contains high rate voltage samples
of ARINC 429 protocol. We gathered our own data set,
with the kind assistance of Astronautics C.A. LTD. [3].
We sampled two types of transmitters:
1) An M4K429RTx test equipment from Excalibur
Systems [15]. The Excalibur equipment hosts two
transmitters which we label E1 and E2.
2) ADK-3220 Evaluation boards, manufactured by
Holt Integrated Circuits INC. [19]. The board
contains a HI-3220PQ ARINC 429 Protocol IC
connected to 8 HI-8597PSIFF line drivers chips.
Figure 2. The Holt evaluation board on the left, and the fabricated
connector board on the right
We use 4 of the transmitters and two different
boards. We label the transmitters Hxy, where x is
the board number, 1 or 2, and y is the transmitter
number from 0 to 3.
The transmitters were connected to one or more of the
following receivers:
1) An EDCU, a proprietary device manufactured by
Astronautics C.A. LTD. [2]. The device has two
receivers which we label P1 and P2.
2) The ADK-3220 Evaluation boards also host 16
integrated line receivers. We use 2 of the ports
with the two boards. We label the receivers the
same way as the transmitters with Hxy, where x is
the board number as before, and y is the receiver
number.
For sampling we used a Keysight DSO9254A scope.
All signals were sampled at 50Msa/s at a scope bandwidth
of 25MHz. The probes are 500MHz, 10MΩ, 11pF. Each
line was sampled individually. We further downsampled
digitally by a factor of 10 to a rate of 5 MSa/s using a 30
point FIR filter with Hamming window.
The transmitters and receivers were connected through
a custom board that exposes the wires, which we fabri-
cated for this purpose (see Figure 2).
All the devices transmitted the same data at a bit rate
of 100 Kbits/sec. 6 values of words were transmitted.
Interpreting the words with MSB-first transmission
order, the values are: 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFF,
0x55555555, 0xAAAAAAAA, 0x5A5A5A5A,
0xA5A5A5A5. Note that these words include all
the possible segment types. By transmitting the same
data on all devices we make sure that in our experiments
the IDS cannot unintentionally use the message content
to make its decisions.
In addition to the recordings from different transmitter-
receiver pairs, we recorded E1 and E2 transmitting to P1
and P2 respectfully, with different Holt devices attached
as additional receivers.
Table 1 shows the different combinations of
transmitter-receiver in our data set, and the number of
words recorded for each combination.
4. Preliminary Tests
Before we started evaluating our IDS, we performed
a basic proof of concept investigation to assess the “de-
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TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF RECORDED WORDS IN THE DATA SET
Row # Transmitter Receiver #Words
1 E1 P1 4920
2 E1 P1 & H10 4920
3 E1 P1 & H12 4920
4 E1 P1 & H20 4920
5 E1 P1 & H22 4920
6 H10 P1 4920
7 H11 P1 4920
8 H12 P1 4920
9 H13 P1 4920
10 H20 P1 4920
11 H21 P1 4920
12 H22 P1 4920
13 H23 P1 4920
14 E2 P2 4920
15 E2 P2 & H10 4920
16 E2 P2 & H12 4920
17 E2 P2 & H20 4920
18 E2 P2 & H22 4920
19 H10 P2 4920
20 H11 P2 4920
21 H12 P2 4920
22 H13 P2 4920
23 H20 P2 4920
24 H21 P2 4920
25 H22 P2 4920
26 H23 P2 4920
tectability” of hardware changes. To do so we reduced
raw traces of whole words (about 1600 samples) to 2 di-
mensions with Primary Component Analysis (PCA) [30].
Figure 3 shows the result of the PCA on a represen-
tative subset of our data set. In the figure there are 6
distinctive clusters, each one corresponds to words with
a different message. The PCA naturally separates the
words by the value of the message they transmit, since
this property is responsible for the bulk of the difference
between words.
In Figure 4 we zoom in on the leftmost cluster, which
contains only words with the message 0x5A5A5A5A. We
see that in fact, the 0x5A5A5A5A cluster is made up of
smaller clusters. The words are labeled according to the
transmitter that sent them. The figure shows that most (but
not all) groups of words from the same transmitter form
a cluster that is visibly distinguishable from the others, as
demonstrated by the dashed ellipses. This indicates that
the information needed to distinguish between different
transmitters is present in the sampled words.
Figure 5 shows the same words, labeled according to
the primary receiver that was connected to the line (P1 or
P2). The transmitters E1 and E2 are removed from the
figure because each was only recorded with one receiver.
We see that the two labels are visually distinguishable, as
demonstrated by the dashed curved line. We conclude that
receivers, as well as transmitters, can be fingerprinted.
Lastly, in Figure 6 the words are labeled according
to the presence and identity of an additional receiver on
the bus. Only words from transmitters E1 and E2 are
displayed, because the Holt transmitters were not recorded
with additional receivers (recall Table 1). The figure shows
that identifying an additional receiver is much more diffi-
cult than identifying a transmitter or a receiver, since we
cannot separate words from different labels by a simple
line or convex shape. This fact does not mean that it is
Figure 3. PCA dimensionality reduction of whole words
Figure 4. Dimensionality reduction of whole words, message
0x5A5A5A5A, label by transmitter ID
impossible to detect an additional transmitter, only that it
requires more information than that which is present in
the first two primary components alone.
Of course, we can’t use this basic PCA method to
implement an anomaly detector. First, we would need to
record in advance all the possible words the transmitter
LRU might transmit. And second, we used samples from
all recordings when calculating the primary components,
without distinguishing between a normal and a rogue
system—in a real IDS, we can only use samples from
the guarded bus to train our anomaly detector. Still, the
above figures provide positive evidence that transmitter
switches and receiver switches change the electrical signal
in a noticeable way, while they do not provide definite
proof that receiver addition does not.
5. The Hardware Fingerprinting Approach
The fingerprinting IDS we propose has to be attached
to the bus it is guarding. During a training period it
samples the bus and learns the transmitter LRU’s charac-
teristics. We assume that during this time only legitimate
devices are present on the bus. We further assume that
access to the IDS is restricted, so that only authorized
personnel are able to trigger the training mechanism. This
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Figure 5. Dimensionality reduction of whole words, message
0x5A5A5A5A, label by receiver ID
Figure 6. Dimensionality reduction of whole words, message
0x5A5A5A5A, label by additional receiver ID
restriction is in place in order to prevent an adversary from
retraining the IDS after switching the guarded transmitter
by the rogue one.
5.1. Advantage Over Content Based IDSs
An intrusion detection system which draws its infor-
mation exclusively from the digital content of the transmit-
ted messages will be unable to detect the rogue transmitter
LRU during the latter’s dormant phases, or to detect a
rogue receiver LRU. Only during an active phase of the
attack of a rogue transmitter LRU is the transmitted data
distinguishable from that of a legitimate transmission.
By utilizing information from the analog domain, we
are able to detect hardware changes independently from
the transmitted data. Usually, before takeoff, the aircraft
systems are checked for basic integrity. During these pre-
flight operations the changes to the bus can be detected,
even if the transmitter LRU is sending normal data.
5.2. IDS Overview
We will next describe our proposed method of
anomaly detection. We divide the algorithm into several
stages. This section provides an overview of these steps.
In the subsequent sections selected stages are explained
in greater detail as needed.
1) [Acquisition] We sample both lines of the bus at
a sampling rate that is 50 times higher than the
bit rate. We used a sample rate of 5 MSa/s. The
differential signal is obtained by subtracting the
samples of line B from the samples of line A.
2) [Segmentation] Each word is split into 127 seg-
ments of 10 different types, based on voltage
levels. The purpose of the segmentation is to
eliminate the effect of the transmitted data, i.e.,
the content of the word, on the final decision of
the anomaly detector. See Section 6 for details.
3) [Feature Extraction] We extract multiple fea-
tures from each segment. See Section 7 for de-
tails.
4) [Anomaly Detection per Segment] The features
from each segment are fed into a trained anomaly
detector. Each segment is marked as either “nor-
mal” or “anomaly”.
5) [Voting] A word is flagged as an “anomaly”, if
the number of “normal” segments it contains does
not exceed Tvotes, a calibrated threshold.
6) [Suspicion Counter] We keep a counter of
anomalous words. Each time a word is declared
as an “anomaly”, the counter is increased by 1,
and each time a word is declared as “normal”,
the counter is decreased by 1, to a minimum
of 0. Once the counter reaches a threshold of
Tsuspicion an alarm is raised.
5.3. Anomaly Detection per Segment
Our basic building block uses per-segment anomaly
detection. As we shall see there are 10 types of segments,
as detailed in Table 2 in Section 6. A segment’s charac-
teristics depend on its type. Therefore, we opted to train
a different anomaly detector for each type of segment.
Anomaly detection, sometimes called novelty detec-
tion, is a well-established. There are numerous outlier and
anomaly detection algorithms available in the literature
such as K-Nearest Neighbors [18], Mixture Models [29],
One-Class SVM [35] and Isolation Forest [24]. An exten-
sive review of various algorithms is presented in [32].
For the anomaly detection task, we chose to work
with the Local Outlier Factor (LOF) by Breunig et al.
[4]. LOF was shown to work better than other algorithms
for the task of network intrusion detection [23]. This
fact, together with the available scikit-learn [31] Python
implementation, made it an appealing choice. Compar-
ing different anomaly detection algorithms is beyond the
scope of this paper.
LOF is a density-based outlier detection algorithm.
According to the LOF algorithm, an outlier is defined as a
data point (feature vector), whose local density is greater
than the average of local densities of its neighbors by a
large enough margin. A local density of a data point is
the inverse of the average distance of the point from its
neighbors.
There are several hyper-parameters for the LOF al-
gorithm. In all cases we used the default parameters pro-
vided by the implementation. For the number of neighbors
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examined when calculating the LOF the default is 20.
We used the Euclidean metric for the distance measure.
The threshold on the local outlier factor that defines an
anomaly is automatically set so that 10% of samples in
the training set are outliers.
We constructed a separate anomaly detector for each
type of segment. Each segment is fed individually into its
appropriate LOF anomaly detector. The LOF outputs its
determination regarding the source of the segment, either
“normal” or “anomaly”.
5.4. Voting
We gather the decisions made by the different LOF
detectors for all segments of the same word. The number
of segments that have been identified as normal is sub-
jected to a voting threshold Tvotes. If it does not exceed
Tvotes, the word is flagged as an “anomaly”, otherwise, it
is flagged as “normal”.
5.5. Suspicion Counter
According to our adversary model, an attacker tampers
with the system only once. Therefore, we expect the true
label of all words in the incoming stream to be identical—
either all the words originate from the original system,
or all the words originate from a compromised system.
We utilize this attack model to reduce the probability of
making an error. Taking note from [20] we incorporate an
anomaly counter, which we name the suspicion counter.
The suspicion counter is a counter that is updated
on the arrival of a new word. The initial value of the
counter is 0. When a word is declared as an “anomaly”,
the counter is increased by 1, and when a word is declared
as “normal”, the counter is decreased by 1, to a minimum
of 0. Once the counter reaches a calibrated threshold of
Tsuspicion an alarm is raised.
6. Signal Segmentation
Our method aims to rely solely on the physical char-
acteristics of the hardware, and aims to be completely
agnostic to the transmitted data. In order to achieve this
goal, we divide each word into sub-bit non-overlapping
segments.
In a BRTZ line protocol, each bit comprises of 4
distinct segments. For example, a ‘1’ bit starts with a
transition up from “NULL” to “HI”, then a plateau on
“HI”, then a transition down from “HI” back to “NULL”,
and finally a “NULL” plateau. Furthermore, we observed
4 different variants of “NULL”, depending on the current
and on the next bit. E.g., a “NULL” between two ‘1’ bits
tends to be “smile”-shaped, while a “NULL” between two
‘0’ bits has a “frown” shape. All in all, we identified 10
different segment types, as listed in Table 2.
Thus, we split every 32-bit word into 127 segments.
Note that there are only 127 segments, not 128, because
the last bit is followed by a long “NULL” that lasts until
the next word and has a unique shape. We do not associate
this segment with any word.
The segmentation is performed in the following man-
ner. A segment starts where the voltage level of the signal
TABLE 2. VOLTAGE THRESHOLDS PER SEGMENT TYPE
Segment Starting Threshold Ending Threshold
LO falls below −Vh1 rises above −Vh2
HI rises above Vh1 falls below Vh2
NULL, HI to HI falls below Vl1 rises above Vl2
NULL, HI to LO falls below Vl1 falls below −Vl2
NULL, LO to LO rises above −Vl1 falls below −Vl2
NULL, LO to HI rises above −Vl1 rises above Vl2
Up from LO rises above −Vh2 rises above −Vl1
Up from NULL rises above Vl2 rises above Vh1
Down from HI falls below Vh2 falls below Vl1
Down from NULL falls below −Vl2 falls below −Vh1
Figure 7. A segmentation example of the bits 01. The trace exhibits all 4
up/down transitions, the “HI” and “LO” plateaus, and 3 of the 4 possible
“NULL” segment types
rises above / falls below a certain threshold, and ends
where it falls below / rises above another threshold. 4
different thresholds are employed in order to produce a
stabling hysteresis effect. We denote them as follows, and
use them and their negative to define segment boundaries:
Vl1 = 2.0V
Vl2 = 2.8V
Vh1 = 8.0V
Vh2 = 7.2V
Table 2 shows the voltage levels used for each segment
type. Figure 7 shows an example of word segmentation.
7. Feature Sets
In our work we compare the performance of the
feature sets described below.
Raw Time-Domain Samples. This feature set consists
of the raw vector of sequential voltage samples. The
only additional operation we perform after segmentation
is truncating the segments to a common length, since the
LOF algorithm expects all data points to be vectors of
the same dimension. The length varies depending on the
segment type, as shown in Table 4. At the sample rate
we use (recall Section 5.2) the number of samples per
segment is quite low - between 4-24 (see Table 4). This
makes the Raw feature set a practical choice.
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TABLE 3. GENERIC FEATURE SET
Feature Description
Mean µ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x(i)
Standard Deviation σ =
√
1
N
∑N
i=1(x(i)− µ)2
Variance σ2 = 1
N
∑N
i=1(x(i)− µ)2
Skewness skew = 1
N
∑N
i=1(
x(i)−µ
σ
)3
Kurtosis kurt = 1
N
∑N
i=1(
x(i)−µ
σ
)4
Root Mean Square rms =
√
1
N
∑N
i=1 x(i)
2
Maximum max = max(x(i))i=1...N
Energy en = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x(i)
2
Generic Time-Domain Feature Set. As discussed in
Section 1.2, in recent years a number of papers suggested
using extracted features to perform hardware fingerprint-
ing [8], [9], [12], [20]. They all utilized time-domain
features such as mean, standard deviation, skewness etc.,
with good results.
These features are of a generic nature, in the sense
that the shape of the signal does not affect the extraction
process. Due to this property, it is possible to apply the
same features in different fields of research.
We use the features that were presented in [20] as our
Generic set. Six of the eight features in this feature set
are used in all four cited papers. The features we used are
listed in Table 3.
In addition to time-domain features, the cited papers
also employ frequency-domain features. We do not use
frequency-domain features in this paper. We argue that the
non-periodic nature of the signals, that are the result of
our segmentation method, does not benefit from frequency
analysis.
Polynomial Feature Set. The features in this set are
calculated by performing a least squares polynomial fit
and taking each coefficient as a separate feature, plus the
residual as an additional feature.
In order to avoid overfitting, we fit each type of
segment with a polynomial function of an appropriate
degree. For the four transitions (“Up from LO”, “Up from
NULL”, “Down from HI”, “Down from NULL”) we use
a degree of 2. For “NULL, HI to HI” and “NULL, LO to
LO” we use a degree of 6, on account of these segments
being even functions. For the remaining segments we use
a degree of 7 for similar reasons. Note that the number
of features is always one more than the degree due to the
residual.
Hand-Crafted Feature Set. In this feature set there
are different features for each segment type.
We observed that the “HI” segments contain
an overshoot followed by ripples. We denote by
(t1, v1), (t2, v2), (t3, v3) the time and voltage level at the
first local maxima (the overshoot), then the first local
minima that follows and then the first local maxima
that follows. Time is measured from the beginning of
the segment. The features we take are the above 6 val-
ues, in addition to the differences in time and volt-
age of the second and third points from the first point:
t2− t1, v2− v1, t3− t1, v3− v1. The features in the “LO”
segments are a mirror image of the features in the “HI”
segment.
For “NULL, HI to HI” and “NULL, LO to LO” we
TABLE 4. NUMBER OF FEATURES PER SEGMENT TYPE
Segment Segment Length Raw Generic Polynomial Hand-Crafted
LO 20-24 20 8 7 10
HI 20-23 20 8 7 10
NULL, HI to HI 17-22 17 8 7 2
NULL, HI to LO 17-21 17 8 8 0
NULL, LO to LO 17-22 17 8 7 2
NULL, LO to HI 17-21 17 8 8 0
Up from LO 4-6 4 8 3 2
Up from NULL 4-6 4 8 3 2
Down from HI 4-5 4 8 3 2
Down from NULL 4-5 4 8 3 2
only take the time and voltage levels at the overshoot
(t1, v1): not all segments of these types in the data set
have ripples.
The 4 transition segments are linear-like. For them
we extract 2 features. The first is the mean of the first
derivative. This quantifies the slope. The second is feature
is the mean of differences of the segment from a line
that passes between the segment’s endpoints. This feature
quantifies the deviation of the segment from a straight
line.
The segments “NULL, LO to HI” and “NULL, HI to
LO” do not participate: not all segments of these types in
the data set contain an overshoot.
8. Detection based on a Single Word
8.1. Methodology
In order to evaluate the performance of our algo-
rithm, we performed an extensive series of experiments.
In each experiment we selected one transmitter LRU as a
guarded device. Its measurements are labeled as normal,
indicating the legitimate state where the adversary has
not yet tampered with the system. In each experiment we
selected a group of other devices as rogue devices. Their
measurements are labeled as anomalies, representing the
state of the system after it was changed by an adversary.
In all cases we used a train-test split of 60%-40% of
the measurements labeled as normal. The measurements
labeled as anomalies are not present in the training set.
For the purpose of comparing the different feature
sets, we set Tsuspicion = 1. We then run our algorithm
and calculate the false alarm and misdetection rates (FAR
& MDR respectively) as functions of Tvotes. Next, we
find the equal error rate (EER), the rate at which the
FAR equals the MDR. The EER is the metric we use
for comparing different hyper-parameters.
In our graphs we convert the EER to “false alarms
per second” (FA/Sec) under normal operation (system
unaltered by an adversary). This gives a more concrete
meaning to the numbers. The FA/Sec is calculated by
multiplying the EER by the message rate, and is the
inverse of mean time between failures. Note that each
word occupies 36 bits, because the protocol mandates a
minimum inter-word gap of at least 4 bit times. Thus the
FA/Sec metric is defined as:
FA/Sec =
1
MTBF
= EER · 100Kbits/sec
36bits
Note that since the FA/Sec is linear in the EER, we
can discuss the graphs as though they display the EER
when giving a qualitative analysis.
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Figure 8. Comparing the feature sets for identifying a rogue transmitter.
8.2. Identifying a Rogue Transmitter
In this series of experiments we simulate an attack,
where the adversary switches the guarded transmitter LRU
by a rogue transmitter LRU. In each experiment we desig-
nate one of the transmitters as the legitimate device to be
guarded. In addition, we choose one receiver, either P1 or
P2. We train our IDS to identify samples from the chosen
Tx-Rx pair as normal.
We then test the trained IDS. We simulate a rogue
transmitter LRU by using measurements of other trans-
mitters connected to the chosen receiver as anomalies. We
remind the reader that during each measurement, only one
transmitter is connected to the bus.
Only the Holt devices were used to simulate rogue
transmitters, regardless of whether the guarded transmitter
is an Excalibur (E1 or E2) or a Holt (H10, ..., H13, H20,
..., H23).
For example, if we choose E1 as the guarded trans-
mitter and P1 as the receiver, words from row 1 in Table
1 are labeled as normal and used in the training stage and
in the testing stage. Words from rows 6-13 are labeled as
anomalies and used in the testing stage.
We repeat this process for all possible values of Tvotes
(0-127) while keeping Tsuspicion = 1. For each value of
Tvotes we indicate the MDR and the FAR. From these
values we obtain the EER and the FA/sec.
We repeat this process for four feature sets with all
pairs of guarded transmitter and receiver. We end up with
18 experiments per feature set.
The results are presented as a box plot in Figure 8.
The x axis splits the results according to the used feature
set. The y axis shows the false alarms per second, and 0 is
the perfect score. The horizontal line in the middle of the
box and the number written next to it indicate the median.
The bottom and top boundaries of the box indicate the
1st and 3rd quartiles respectively. The horizontal lines
outside of the box (the whiskers) indicate the minimum
and maximum values.
The figure shows that intruder detection yields the best
results in term of EER when we use the Raw feature set.
Both the median and the spread of the values are low. The
EER values for the Generic and Polynomial feature sets
are slightly more spread out, and the median is greater.
The Hand-Crafted feature set is clearly inferior.
The Generic, Raw and Polynomial feature sets have
comparable performance, with Raw being slightly better
with a median EER value of 0.12% compared to 0.32%
and 0.19% for the Generic and Polynomial feature sets.
Since there is no significant reduction in memory costs
from using the Generic feature set (recall Table 4), we
conclude that in our case it is best to use the raw voltage
samples, since in the trade-off between memory/runtime
and performance, with the Generic set we spend signifi-
cant effort to extract the features, and obtain no gain in
comparison to the raw signal.
We point out that there is a correlation between the
number of features in the set and the performance of the
feature set. The feature sets with reduced performance,
namely the Hand-Crafted and Polynomial sets, have sig-
nificantly fewer features for some segments - as few as 2
- and the Hand-Crafted sets totally ignores two segment
types. The more features there are in the set, the more
expressive the model is. Perhaps the two feature sets
would perform better if they included additional features.
Interestingly, for all feature sets there are experiments
which reached a perfect EER value of 0. The guarded
transmitters in these perfect experiments are E1, E2 and
H10. Why do we achieve these results for E1 and E2? We
point out that we only use the Holt boards to simulate
rogue devices. This means that in experiments where E1
and E2 are used as guarded devices, the IDS is tasked
with differentiating between a guarded device and rogue
devices that are manufactured by different vendors. We
expect devices from different models to have different
characteristics. However, we achieve EER = 0 for the
Holt device H10 as a guarded device as well - indicating
that even for the same manufacturer there are significant
differences in the hardware fingerprint of individual de-
vices.
We demonstrate this point by examining two selected
experiments. We plot the MDR and the FAR as a function
of the threshold value using E1 (Figure 9) and of H21
(Figure 10) as guarded devices. Both are connected to P1
and in both figures the Raw feature set is used. Note that
again, in these graphs, lower is better.
Figures 9 and 10 show that the two cases pose different
levels of challenge for the IDS. In case of the E1 trans-
mitter (Figure 9), the MDR and the FAR curves do not
intersect. In fact, the MDR overlaps the left-side boundary
of the figure. There is a wide range of thresholds, for
which an error rate of 0 can be achieved simultaneously
for both rates. This makes E1 easily distinguishable from
Holt transmitters. In contrast, in the case of the H21
transmitter (Figure 10) there is only a narrow range of
thresholds for which both error rates are small, and the
EER is greater than 0. This makes the tuning of the
threshold important.
Another thing to observe is that in both Figures 9 and
10 the FAR curve is roughly the same, while the MDR
curve spreads to higher thresholds in Figure 10. Note that
the FAR is only calculated from samples of the guarded
transmitter, and that the MDR is only calculated from
samples of the rogue transmitters. The task of labeling
a word from a guarded device as normal is not affected
by the type of the guarded device. However, the success
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Figure 9. FAR and MDR for E1 as guarded as a function of the threshold
Figure 10. FAR and MDR for H21 as guarded as a function of the
threshold
of the task of labeling rogue transmitters as anomalies
heavily depends on the uniqueness of the guarded device.
8.3. Identifying a Rogue Receiver Switch
In the next series of experiments we simulate an attack,
where the adversary replaces an existing receiver with a
rogue one. The training stage is the same as the training
stage in the previous series of experiments: One of the
Holt devices is used as a transmitter, and either P1 or P2
is used a receiver.
In the testing stage, we simulate an attack by using
measurements taken with the same transmitter as in the
training stage, but with the other receiver LRU.
For example, if we choose H10 as the guarded trans-
mitter and P1 as the receiver, words from row 6 in Table
1 are labeled as normal and used in the training stage and
in the testing stage. Words from rows 19 are labeled as
anomalies and used in the testing stage. In other words,
P1 as replaced by P2.
The results are shown in Figure 11. We see that all
feature sets perform worse than they did in identifying
rogue transmitters (compare to Figure 8). That is to be
expected, since communication systems are designed to
mitigate the effect of the receivers on the transmission
Figure 11. Comparing the feature sets for identifying a rogue receiver
switch.
signal. The surprising result is that the Generic feature set
performs better in this scenario than the Raw feature set,
and the Polynomial feature set performs better than both
of them. The fact that different feature sets are sensitive to
changes in different components of the monitored system
could be used to our advantage. An IDS could incorporate
different anomaly detectors based on different feature sets.
When an anomaly is detected, we could then identify
the source of the attack by checking which feature set
triggered the alarm.
8.4. Identifying an Addition of a Rogue Receiver
In the final series of experiments we simulate an
attack, where the adversary connects an additional receiver
to the bus. The training stage is the same as the training
stage in the previous series of experiments, except that
only E1 and E2 are used as transmitters.
In the testing stage, we use measurements taken where
a Holt receiver was connected to the bus in addition to the
transmitter and receiver from the training stage.
For example, if we choose E1 as the guarded trans-
mitter and P1 as the receiver, words from row 1 in Table
1 are labeled as normal and used in the training stage and
in the testing stage. Words from rows 2-5 are labeled as
anomalies and used in the testing stage.
The results are shown in Figure 12. Note that there
are only two data points for each feature set (one for E1
and one for E2). The numbers over the box plot represent
the mean instead of the median.
In this series of experiments all feature sets perform
poorly. By comparing Figures 11 and 12 we learn that
adding a receiver affects the electrical characteristics sig-
nificantly less than replacing a receiver. This might stem
from differences in hardware between the Holt evaluation
boards and the proprietary receivers. Switching P1 for
P2 (or vice versa) also means altering a long segment
of the transmission line, while connecting an evaluation
board receiver is accomplished by connecting two short
wires to a header on our fabricated connector board. We
interpret the results in the following way: The electrical
characteristics are not especially sensitive to the receiver,
but rather to the transmission line as a whole.
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Figure 12. Comparing the feature sets for identifying a rogue receiver
addition.
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Figure 13. Suspicion counter example for Tsuspicion = 3
9. Modeling the Suspicion Counter
In this section we analyze the effect of the suspicion
counter on the overall false alarm rate, using a Markov-
chain approach. Let the probability that a word is detected
as anomalous be denoted by p, and assume that the events
of detecting a word as anomalous are i.i.d. Then we can
describe the value of the counter after word i arrives as
a Markov random process. Figure 13 shows, for example,
the Markov process that corresponds to Tsuspicion = 3.
Each state in the diagram corresponds to a counter
value. For a state representing a counter value of 0 <
i < Tsuspicion there is a transition to the right, with
probability p, indicating that a word was detected as an
anomaly (and the counter is increased), and a transition to
the left, with probability 1− p, indicating a normal word
(and the counter is decreased). The first and last states
(i = 0 and i = Tsuspicion respectfully) are unique. The
counter cannot be decreased below 0. Therefore, when
i = 0, instead of a transition left we see a self-loop with
probability 1− p. Finally, the state for i = Tsuspicion is a
final state indicating that an alarm is raised: the probability
of staying at i = Tsuspicion is 1.
The transition matrix of such a Markov process is
given by:
P =

1− p p 0 0 · · · 0
1− p 0 p 0 · · · 0
...
0 · · · 0 1− p 0 p
0 · · · 0 0 0 1
 (1)
The vector x(n) represents the distribution of probabilities
between counter values after word n was processed. The
counter always starts at 0. Therefore:
x(0) =
[
1 0 0 · · · 0] (2)
Figure 14. Probability for a false alarm during a 10-hour flight
Figure 15. Time until the probability of a true detection exceeds 99.999%
The distribution of probabilities after n words is given by
raising the transition matrix P to the power of n:
x(n) = x(0)Pn (3)
The probability of the counter reaching Tsuspicion after
up to n words is exactly the probability of reaching the
final state i = Tsuspicion, which is given by element
Tsuspicion + 1 of x(n).
Figure 14 shows the probability of a false alarm occur-
ring during a 10-hour flight as a function of Tsuspicion for
different values of p. We assume an average transmission
rate of 610 words per second, which is about 20% of the
maximal available bandwidth. This is the rate used in our
data set. We can see that for every value of p, if Tsuspicion
is high enough, the false alarm rate probability drops to
0. The lower p is, the minimal Tsuspicion that is required
is lower. Interestingly, even for a very high single-word
false alarm probability of 40%, at a Tsuspicion value of
just 50 the probability of a false alarm drops to 0.
Figure 15 show the time it takes for the probability for
a positive (anomaly) detection to reach 99.999%. Here all
the transmitted words are assumed to originate from a
rogue system, therefore we set p > 0.5. A low detection
time means that the system is quick at detecting the
adversary. The figure shows that the time until detection
rises as Tsuspicion rises. The rise is quicker for low values
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of p. Even so, with a very poor detection probability of
p = 0.6 and Tsuspicion = 100, (which is much more
than the threshold required to bring the false alarm rate to
near 0), the time until detection reaches only 2 seconds.
So, we can see from the Markov model that using a
suspicion counter drastically reduces the false alarm rate,
while slowing down the detection only mildly.
10. Performance of the Complete Method
The results we attained in Section 8 are encouraging:
we can successfully fingerprint a transmitter based on a
single word. However, the FA/Sec metric of around 5
alarms per second is still too high for a realistic system. To
reduce the FA/Sec rate to near-zero, we use the suspicion
counter we analyzed in Section 9, and raise an alarm only
when the counter exceeds Tsuspicion. In this section we
empirically evaluate the behavior of the complete system
as a function of the threshold Tsuspicion.
We do not discuss how to identify an additional
receiver, since we could not identify it with sufficient
certainty in Section 8.
In Section 8 we saw that different feature sets are
suited for detecting different adversary models; the Raw
feature set for detecting a rogue transmitter, and the Poly-
nomial feature set for detecting a rogue receiver. We now
continue our evaluation with these two feature sets.
We wish to examine the FAR as a function of the
counter threshold. For each transmitter-receiver pair in
our data set we repeat the following procedure. First,
we train an anomaly detector on words recorded with
the selected pair. Then we test the detector 1000 times
on words recorded with the same pair. Each time we
use the same 1968 words after cyclically shifting them
by a random integer in order to start the counter at a
different point in time. We compute the FAR by dividing
the number of times an anomaly was detected by the
total number of measurements. Overall there are such
18000 measurements for each data set (9 transmitters ×
2 receivers × 1000 repetitions). We repeat this procedure
with different values of Tsuspicion, once for each feature
set. We use Tvotes = 100 in all experiments. Experiments
in Section 8 show that this is a reasonable choice that
balances the FAR and the MDR for detection based on
single words. The train-test split is 60%-40%. Figure 16
shows the results.
As predicted by the Markov analysis, the false
alarm rate drops dramatically as Tsuspicion increases. For
Tsuspicion greater than 16, there were no false alarms:
the empirical results and the Markov analysis are in
agreement, and the empirical Figure 16 is similar to the
theoretical Figure 14. In both the false alarm probability
starts at 1, is stable for low values of Tsuspicion, drops
quickly and finally decays to 0.
For observing the trade-off of using an anomaly
counter, measuring the MDR rate is inefficient, since given
sufficient time an anomaly will eventually be detected.
Instead of measuring the MDR, we measure the time it
takes for our detector to raise an alarm. The procedure is
similar to the procedure of measuring the FAR. Instead
of testing the trained detector on words recorded with the
same transmitter-receiver pair as the one on which it was
trained, we test it on words from other pairs, according to
Figure 16. FAR as a function of Tsuspicion. Tvotes = 100
the adversary model that is being simulated, as explained
in section 8.1. The Raw feature set is used for measuring
a rogue transmitter detection, and the polynomial feature
set is used when detecting a rogue receiver. We count the
number of words it takes for the detector to raise an alarm.
Overall, for a rogue transmitter there are 144000 measure-
ments (9 guarded transmitters × 8 rogue transmitters ×
2 receivers × 1000 repetitions) and for a rogue receiver
there are 8000 measurements (8 transmitters × 1 guarded
receiver × 1 rogue receiver × 1000 repetitions) for each
value of Tsuspicion.
Figure 17 shows the maximal (worst case) time we
measured for detecting a rogue transmitter over all com-
binations of guarded and attacking transmitters. Figure
18 shows the same for detecting a rogue receiver. The
blue line indicates a lower bound—the time it takes to
transmit Tsuspicion messages. In our test set the average
transmission rate is 610 words per second, which is about
20% of the maximal available bandwidth.
The figures show that the suspicion counter reduces
false alarms at the expense of only mildly delaying the
detection of an attack. We find the trade-off worthwhile.
Even when Tsuspicion = 20 and there are no false alarms,
a rogue transmitter is detected in under 50ms, which
greatly reduces the adversaries ability to mount a suc-
cessful attack, and a rogue receiver is detected in several
seconds, which is still good.
In both cases, the maximal observed detection time
rises faster than lower bound. For rogue transmitter detec-
tion, the maximal time is of the same order of magnitude
of as the lower bound, while for the case of rogue receiver
detection, the maximal time is an order of magnitude
higher. The gap is explained by the difference in misde-
tection rates for single words, measured in section 8. The
difference between the slopes is predicted by the Markov
analysis. Figure 15 shows that as the misdetection rate
of a single word increases, so does the rate at which the
detection time rises.
11. Conclusions
We presented a first hardware fingerprinting method
for the ARINC 429 bus. The method can be used to retrofit
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Figure 17. Maximal length of time for detecting a rogue transmitter.
Tvotes = 100
Figure 18. Maximal length of time for detecting a rogue receiver.
Tvotes = 100
source authentication into existing avionic systems with
low effort.
We showed that our method is especially effective
for identifying a technician attack, in which an adversary
replaces a legitimate LRU with a rogue one. We demon-
strated that even transmitter LRUs of the same make and
model are different enough from one another for them
to generate distinguishable signals. All the more so when
dealing with devices from different vendors. We found
that skipping the feature extraction stage and using the
raw signal achieves the best result.
We showed that the method can also detect a switched
receiver. We found that the Polynomial feature set, which
was conceived for the purpose of this paper, achieves the
best performance among the feature sets we examined,
when applied to this task.
We showed that by augmenting the per-word anomaly
detection by a “suspicion counter”, we can drastically
reduce the false-alarm rate. Using both a Markov-chain
analysis and an extensive empirical evaluation, we demon-
strated that our full intrusion detection system is quite re-
alistic: e.g., it achieves near-zero false alarms per second,
while detecting a rogue transmitter in under 50ms, and
detecting a rogue receiver in under 3 seconds. In other
words, technician attacks can be reliably detected during
the pre-flight checks, well before the aircraft takes off.
Further work needs to be done in order to evaluate
the sensitivity of the hardware fingerprints to external
changes such as fluctuations in temperature or supply
voltage levels, and to evaluate its stability over time.
ARINC 429 lacks essential security features. It is a
safety liability that is present today in almost every civil
aircraft. Our method could help close of the gap between
ARINC 429 and modern security requirements. Thus, we
argue that it is a valuable addition to the protection of any
airborne system which uses the ARINC 429 bus.
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